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“Citizenship is man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than 
the right to have rights.  Remove this priceless possession and 
there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in 
the eyes of his countrymen.” 






Inside a tent, one of a dozen in a small refugee camp in Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley, rests seven-month-old Nour, a child of Syrian refugees. She is the first 
child of her Syrian parents to be born outside of Syria.2 Investigative journalist 
John Davison documents the struggle of Nour’s family as they navigate the 
incomprehensible landscape of nationality law in Lebanon, all while attempting 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2018; Loyola University 
Chicago, Class of 2015. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell for all of her assistance in 
the preparation of this Note. I am also grateful to the Notre Dame Journal of International and 
Comparative Law for their generous work, and their thoughtful and insightful edits to this Note. 
1 Perez v. Brownell, 365 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting). 
2 John Davison, Redrawing the Middle East: A Generation of Syrian Children Who Don’t Count, 
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to survive under dire conditions.3 Nour’s family fled their native town of Homs 
at the beginning of the Syrian Civil war.4 After two hours spent aboard a 
crowded bus, her pregnant mother, father, and two siblings traveled seventy 
miles into Lebanon where Nour was eventually born.5 Because Nour was born 
outside of Syria, she must be registered at a government office in Lebanon by 
her first birthday in early September.6 If they fail to do so, Nour potentially faces 
the consequences that so many stateless children face: lacking a fundamental 
legal recognition of nationality.7 For Nour to be fully recognized as a Syrian 
national, her parents will need to navigate a maze of legal hurdles requiring the 
family to journey to government offices, traverse military checkpoints, and 
finally approach the Syrian embassy, which many refugees are justifiably scared 
to do.8   
According to a report produced by the UNHCR in 2014, more than ten 
million people in the world are stateless.9 Statelessness occurs due to a number 
of factors, including: political instability; conflicts of law; complex and 
inefficient administrative practices; ethnic, racial, and gender discrimination; 
and even arbitrary deprivations of citizenship rights.10 These factors illustrate 
immense structural inconsistencies that exist between domestic citizenship 
processes and human rights obligations under international law. It is often, 
however, that these structural shortcomings are only exposed in the wake of 
large-scale armed conflict that produces mass exoduses from war-torn nations.11 
This is most evident in the case of the Syrian conflict, as current domestic 
legislation in Syria has produced inefficient, if not obstructive policies that, in 
turn, perpetuate human rights violations against fleeing citizens.  Even a cursory 
examination of domestic Syrian nationality law illustrates the unfortunate reality 
facing vulnerable stateless populations and the insurmountable challenges they 
face when fleeing zones of conflict.12  
The discriminatory nature of the Syrian Nationality Law presents enormous 
obstacles for future generations of displaced Syrian families.13 Syrian nationality 








8 Id.; see also INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, THE WORLD’S STATELESS (2014), 
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf. 
9 INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, supra note 8, at 55.  
10 Id. at 23–27; see also Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 
2014, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/4f5886306.pdf 
[hereinafter Background Note]. 
11 See generally INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, supra note 8; Background Note, supra note 
10. 
12 Elveda Dana Gale, Statelessness Risk of Syrian Refugee Children Born in Turkey 53 (2016) 
(unpublished LLM Thesis, Tilburg University Law School) (available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=141265). 
13 Background Note, supra note 10 (“In Syria, mothers can only confer nationality if the child was 
born in Syria and the father does not establish filiation in relation to the child. Syria has a safeguard in 
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passed through the father.14  Due to immense casualties during the Syrian 
conflict, children born without paternal ancestors are particularly vulnerable to 
the ugly reality of statelessness.15 Furthermore, as the conflict ensues, births are 
often not recorded in an official registry, and children born in exile are especially 
susceptible to the realities of a lack of attributed nationality.16 As millions flee 
their homes and abandon all but their most necessary belongings, many do not 
carry official documentation.17  As a result, this lack of identification threatens 
the future security of Syrian families, and most notably, their children. 
This Note seeks to illustrate structural inconsistencies between domestic 
nationality law and human rights obligations under international law. 
Furthermore, this Note seeks to emphasize the difficulties that arise when 
addressing statelessness in the context of customary international law, as current 
domestic frameworks are inadequate to address its magnitude, specifically in 
light of the modern Syrian refugee crisis. Though the status of refugees, and 
specifically the problem of statelessness, has theoretically been addressed under 
certain Conventions in the latter half of the twentieth century, such Conventions 
lack necessary mechanisms in and of themselves to effectively allay the 
statelessness problem.  
The right to nationality represents far more than legal classification, as Chief 
Justice Earl Warren once described, it is inherently “the right to have rights.”18 
In light of the fundamental connection between citizenship and the rights, 
protections, and privileges that flow forth from its possession, this Note argues 
that obligations under customary international law that exist for the protection 
of guaranteed human dignities should be honored, and domestic legislation that 
obstructs these obligations must be modified. It is imperative to recognize the 
inherent tensions between international customary norms and sovereign 
authority to make citizenship determinations. Addressing principles of 
citizenship through norms of customary international law is problematic, 
though, as it strains credulity to argue that such matters are met with 
consistency.19   
 
 
14 See id. See generally Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War — 470,000, 
PBS (Feb. 11, 2016) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-
war-470000/ (“More than 1 in 10 Syrians have been wounded or killed since the beginning of the war in 
2011, according to a new report that finds a staggering 470,000 deaths have been caused by the conflict, 
either directly or indirectly. . . . ‘Hundreds of thousands of people, particularly male breadwinners, have 
[been] killed, injured, arrested, and kidnapped, enormously endangering their lives and the living 
conditions of their families,’ the report said. ‘The widespread insecurity and unbearable economic 
conditions and hardship, have forced millions of Syrians to resettle inside or outside the country and to 
depend completely on local and international humanitarian aids. This loss of security in all its forms has 
compromised human rights and dignity of the Syrian population.’”).  
15 Boghani, supra note 14.  
16 Id. 
17 Amit Sen, Lacking a Nationality, Some Refugees From Syria Face Acute Risks, U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/52b45bbf6.html (“The issue of 
statelessness – individuals who have no officially recognized nationality – is a problem for some Syrian 
refugees. A 2013 survey in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq found that some 10 per cent of Syrian Kurdish 
refugees are stateless, as many were forced to flee Syria before they could apply for nationality or were 
not eligible because they had never been registered by the Syrian authorities.”). 
18 Perez v. Brownell, 365 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting).  
19 See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
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In the latter half of the twentieth century, international courts have 
traditionally placed less emphasis on consistency of state practice in recognition 
of customary obligations in matters of humanitarian rights.20 It is imperative to 
note, however, that the current international legal framework leaves matters of 
citizenship determinations entirely within the purview of the nation-state.21 
Certainly, it would be ideal for an obligation under customary international law 
to a right to nationality to be honored. However, in order to address the 
statelessness crisis in the wake of the Syrian conflict, the inquiry must begin 
with the reform of obstructive domestic legislation that contravenes international 
human rights obligations.  
The following section of this Note explores the history of the Syrian conflict 
– its origins, its progression, and its effect on massive segments of the Syrian 
population. Part II provides a background of customary international law, and in 
turn, Part III explores the international framework for decisions of nationality, 
and it explores the global normative framework for protection of human rights 
in conjunction with citizenship determinations. Part IV provides insight into 
Syrian Nationality Law, and the consequences of the statutory framework that 
have left its displaced population further vulnerable to statelessness. This section 
emphasizes the ethnic and gender discrimination practices that are inherent in 
Syrian nationality legislation and how such practices not only render Syrian 
nationality processes ineffective but also inhibit segments of the population from 
acquiring a nationality. Part V illustrates the realities that are confronted by 
countries neighboring Syria, and it illustrates the immense political, economic, 
and administrative burdens faced by these nations in the wake of the Syrian 
conflict. Part VI provides concluding remarks on the current state of the 
statelessness problem, and it urges that though there exists inherent tensions 
between international and sovereign authority over citizenship determinations, 
norms of fundamental human rights must come to supersede sovereignty 
considerations with respect to the creation of stateless persons. 
 
 
I. HISTORY OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT 
 
 
Estimates suggest that nearly 465,000 Syrians have lost their lives in five 
and a half years of armed conflict, which began with anti-government protests 
before escalating into a full-scale civil war.22 As a result, 6.1 million persons 
have been internally displaced, and 4.8 million are seeking refuge abroad.23  
Forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule have 




21 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: A 
HUMANITARIAN AGENDA (Jan. 1, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba7d4.html; Michelle Foster & 
Hélène Lambert, Statelessness as a Human Rights Issue: A Concept Whose Time has Come, 28 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 564, 572 (2016). 
22 Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2018),  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html. 
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opposition have found little recourse but to flee their life-long homes.24 As 
remains true, tensions have been further escalated by the actions of jihadist 
militants from the Islamic State.25  
The Syrian conflict began as a result of events surrounding what became 
known as the “Arab Spring.”26 In 2011, protests toppled the regimes of Tunisian 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali27 and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.28 
In March of the same year, peaceful protests arose in Syria as well, after fifteen 
boys were detained and tortured for having written graffiti in support of the Arab 
Spring.29 “The people want the fall of the regime,” the boys wrote.30  Ultimately, 
one of the boys, 13-year-old Hamza al-Khateeb, was killed after having been 
cruelly tortured.31 In July 2011, military defectors proclaimed the formation of 
the Free Syrian Army.32 This rebel group sought to overthrow the government, 
and slowly Syria descended into civil war.33  
As conflict ensued, civil unrest was met with an abrupt, violent crackdown 
by government forces.34 Calls for freedom grew louder, and Assad left 
destruction in his wake. In the early years of the rebellion, each weekly 
demonstration was attributed a “tag-line,” typically constituted by the simple, 
yet powerful words of sermons given by sympathetic imams during mid-day 
prayers.35 This tradition was rebirthed in 2016, and it was reflected in a daily, 
unrelenting call to action––“the revolution continues.”36 As the civil war in Syria 
progressed, millions were forced to flee their homes, exposing an inefficient 
 
 
24 Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22. 
25 Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-26116868 (The “Islamic State has capitalised on the chaos and taken control of large swathes 
of Syria and Iraq, where it proclaimed the creation of a ‘caliphate’ in June 2014. Its many foreign fighters 
are involved in a ‘war within a war’ in Syria, battling rebels and rival jihadists from the al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Nusra Front, as well as government and Kurdish forces.”). 
26 Arab Uprising: Country by Country–Tunisia, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315 (“The downfall of Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abidine Ben 
Ali inspired pro-democracy activists across the Arab world. Widespread discontent at economic hardship, 
decades of autocratic rule and corruption erupted into mass demonstrations in December 2010 after a 
young, unemployed man, Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself after officials stopped him selling 
vegetables in Sidi Bouzid. Around 300 people were killed during the subsequent unrest, which forced 
Ben Ali to resign in January 2011, after 23 years in power, and go into exile in Saudi Arabia. He was later 
sentenced to life in prison in absentia.”). 
27 Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protesters 
Claim Victory, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-
president-flees-country-protests. 
28Profile: Hosni Mubarak, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/200912693048491779.html. 
29 Kelly McEvers, Revisiting the Spark That Kindled the Syrian Uprising, NPR (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148719850/revisiting-the-spark-that-kindled-the-syrian-uprising. 
30 Id. 
31 Tortured and Killed: Hamz al-Khateeb, Age 13, AL JAZEERA (May 31, 2011), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153185927813389.html.  
32 Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22. 
33 Id. 
34 Louisa Loveluck, Hundreds Across Syria protest Against Assad for the First Time in Years, 
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administrative regional infrastructure that was rendered incapable of dealing 
with the massive flight of peoples from zones of conflict.37   
The consequences of the Syrian conflict have exposed the growing problem 
of statelessness in the affected region and its global ramifications.38 In addition, 
the complexities, inconsistencies, and the structurally discriminatory nature of 
citizenship law in the region and particularly in Syria have contributed 
immensely to the global statelessness population.39 As a result, it is necessary 
that the international community respond, and in turn, resolve to address the 
statelessness crisis confronting refugees fleeing zones of conflict by honoring 
commitments under widely-accepted human rights conventions. The following 
section will provide foundational principles regarding obligations under 
customary international law. In the section that follows next, this Note will 
explore the global normative framework of nationality. In turn, and more 
critically, this Note will assess the responsibility of nations under humanitarian 
treaties at international law, specifically in the context of customary obligations 








The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) describes customary international 
law as “a general practice accepted as law.”40It is widely recognized that the 
existence of a rule of customary international law requires the presence of two 
distinct elements: (1) state practice; and (2) a subjective belief that such practice 
is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the formulation of the doctrine, 
as a matter of law (opinio juris).41 The opinions of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (“PCIJ”) and those of the ICJ have repeatedly 
acknowledged that the existence of a customary rule of international law 





37 Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22; see also Gale, supra note 12, at 
50–51. 
38 Louise Osborne & Ruby Russell, Refugee Crisis Creates ‘Stateless Generation’ of Children in 
Limbo, GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/27/refugee-crisis-
creating-stateless-generation-children-experts-warn. 
39 Gale, supra note 12, at 53. 
40 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 
(Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ also contains the modern definition of customary international law: 
“[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply . . . (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”). 
41 Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 305, 305 (2014) (citation omitted). 
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A. STATE PRACTICE 
 
Traditionally, in establishing whether a certain doctrine has become a 
customary rule of international law, jurists have placed most emphasis on state 
conduct.43 In assessing state practice, it must be sufficiently “dense” to establish 
a rule of customary international law.44 The ICJ has established that “constant 
and uniform usage” is required for establishing a customary rule.45 There is not 
a definitive length of time that is required for certain practices to be sufficiently 
considered customary, as the ICJ stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases: 
 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of 
customary international law on the basis of what was originally 
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement 
would be that within the period in question, short though it 
might be, State practice, including that of States whose 
interests are specially affected, should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked;- and should moreover have occurred in such a way as 
to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved.46 
 
The principles of uniformity and consistency of practice are largely a matter of 
interpretation.47 Complete uniformity of practice is not required, though 
substantial uniformity must be established for the state practice element to be 
satisfied.48 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
when the Court analyzed the customary nature of the principles of non-
intervention, the ICJ stated that: 
 
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the 
application of the rules in question should have been perfect, 
in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency . . . The Court does not consider that, for a rule to 
be established as customary, the corresponding practice must 
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to 
deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it 
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
 
 
43 Id. at 312. 
44 Sir Claud Humphrey Meredith Waldock, General Course on Public International Law (Vol. 106), 
in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962). 
45 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, at 276 (Nov. 20). 
46 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 
20). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (“State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been 
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have 
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been 
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.49   
 
If consistency and uniformity of practice is established, formation of a 
customary rule does not require a specific passage of time in order for it to be 
effective,50 as exemplified by the rules of airspace and the rules affecting the 
continental shelf which have come into effect following a short period of 
uniformity.51 The second element of establishing a rule of customary 
international law is opinio juris. 
 
B. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT: OPINIO JURIS 
 
In order to establish a rule of customary international law, it has been 
emphasized that such an establishment requires not only evidence of state 
practice but also a subjective belief that the state is bound to abide by the doctrine 
in question, known as opinio juris sive necessitatis, abbreviated as opinio juris.52 
Further, it is established that the nation must follow the practice because of 
opinio juris rather than because “of the demands of courtesy, reciprocity, 
political expediency or comity.”53 In the 1985 Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ 
declared that customary international law must be sought “primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio juris of States.”54 In addition, in the 1969 Continental Shelf 
Cases, the ICJ proclaimed that: 
 
Not only must the acts concerned [constituting state practice] 
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or 
carried out in such a way, as to evidence a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a 
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio 
juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel 




49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 186 (June 27) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities]. 
50 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 2012). 
51 Id. 
52 Military and Paramilitary supra note 49, ¶ 207 (“for a new customary rule to be formed, not only 
must the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by opinio juris sive 
neccessitatis. Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have 
behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief . . . the subjective element, is implicit in 
the very notion of opinio juris sive neccessitatis’.” (internal citations omitted)). 
53 Brian D. Lepard, The Necessity of Opinio Juris in the Formation of Customary International Law 
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As such, it is necessary for opinio juris to exist in concert with substantial 
uniformity of state practice so as to establish an obligation under customary 
international law. The following section will explore the international legal 
framework of nationality, and it will address concerns regarding tensions 
between sovereign authority over decisions of nationality and the evolving 
global framework for the protection of human rights. In so doing, the argument 
will be made that principles of customary international law have evolved in 
manner such that states must, at least minimally, seek to avoid the creation of 
stateless persons by perpetuating domestic citizenship regimes that discriminate 
in a manner that exacerbates the statelessness problem. Though it is clear that 
sovereign authority over citizenship decisions is paramount, norms of customary 




III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONALITY 
 
A. TENSIONS BETWEEN SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CONCERNING STATELESSNESS AND A RIGHT TO NATIONALITY 
 
International law respects the inherent autonomy of sovereignty and 
equality of individual states.56 Absent “consent to be bound,” a state is not 
required to remain consistent with obligations under international law.57 In 
addition, it is clear that principles of non-interference at international law 
certainly preclude interference in the domestic jurisdiction of another state.58 
Questions of nationality have principally been addressed as matters of domestic 
jurisdiction falling within the authority of individual sovereigns.59 According to 
Van Waas, however, the domestic actions of sovereign states can be affected by 
the actions of other states under international law.60  In its Advisory Opinion on 
the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees of 1923, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated, “[t]he question of whether a certain matter is or is 
not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative 
question; it depends on the development of international relations.”61 The Court 
continued, illustrating that norms of nationality law must ultimately conform to 
obligations under customary international law: 
 
For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe 
that it may well happen that, in a manner which, like that of 
nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, 
 
 
56 LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 
(2008); see S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 18); see also Military 
and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 49, ¶ 202. 
57 VAN WAAS, supra note 56, at 36 n.26 (noting an important exception to this principle: that jus 
cogens may not be violated, even absent explicit state consent). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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the right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted 
by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other 
States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs 
solely to the State, is limited by rules of international law.62 
 
It can be said that the Permanent Court left determinations of nationality 
within the purview of domestic legislation. However, the Court made clear that 
states are required to act consistently with obligations under customary 
international law.63 The twentieth century has witnessed the evolution of 
numerous foundational instruments that address citizenship determinations in 
the context of human rights such as the 1930 Hague Convention, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. An 
examination of these instruments illustrates prevailing sentiment that norms of 
customary international law have come to favor the protection of human rights. 
As such, this section will proceed to explore the evolution of human rights norms 
that indicate that customary international law has embraced the obligation to 
avoid statelessness, yet in practice, there exists no practical remedy for millions 
of displaced persons. 
 
B. TWENTIETH CENTURY NATIONALITY LAW: A SHIFT TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTIONS 
 
The first attempt to provide protections for the right to nationality was the 
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws (hereinafter “1930 Hague Convention”).64 Considered by 
some scholars to be the most important multilateral agreement in the field of 
nationality, the 1930 Hague Convention affirmed the delegation of exclusive 
authority to sovereign states in matters of nationality.65  Under Chapter I, Article 
I, the 1930 Hague Convention provides, “[i]t is for each State to determine under 
its own laws who are its nationals.”66  The Convention continues, however, with 
the following qualification, “[t]his law shall be recognized by other States in so 
far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and 
the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.”67  As such, 
the means by which a state exercises its right to determine its citizens ought to 
conform to provisions at international law. Notably, decisions at international 
law during the latter half of the twentieth century have developed in favor of 





64 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 
L.N.T.S 89 [hereinafter 1930 Hague Convention]. 
65 PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, XIV (2d ed. 1979). 
66 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 64, at 99.  
67 Id. 
68 See generally VAN WAAS, supra note 56, at 36–47; Sandy Ghandhi, Human Rights and the 
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Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter “1948 
UDHR”), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 
December 1948, “nationality” is codified as a basic human right.69 Under Article 
15 of the Declaration, “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality.”70 Further, “[n]o 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality.”71 The 1948 UDHR, however, neither provides mechanisms for 
enforcement of these principles, nor does it indicate that statelessness violates 
customary international law.72 Even absent such features, the 1948 UDHR exists 
as the foundation for the codification of human rights in the international legal 
system in the latter half of the twentieth century.73  
At the time of its adoption by the General Assembly, it was clear that the 
1948 UDHR did not establish binding obligations on signatories, rather, it 
existed as a “manifesto with primarily moral authority.”74 An examination of the 
1948 UDHR, in and of itself, however, does not end the inquiry into whether its 
principles have attained customary character. Though it is arguably clear that 
international courts have developed inconsistent jurisprudence in their pursuit to 
analyze the existence of both state practice and opinio juris,75 one leading 
scholar illustrates that the former is of less importance in the context of human 
rights.76 He notes that the International Court of Justice’s recent approach 
“accords limited significance to state practice, especially to inconsistent or 
contrary practice, and attributes central normative significance to resolutions 
both of the United Nations General Assembly and of other international 
organizations. . . The burden of proof to be discharged in establishing custom in 
the field of human or humanitarian rights is thus less onerous than in other fields 
of international law.”77  
What is clear, however, is that decisions of citizenship determination remain 
within the purview of the sovereign state, so it may be successfully argued that 
interference with the right of nation-states to make such decisions is an 
encroachment on sovereignty. Thus, it is appropriate to address the statelessness 
crisis through the lens of the normative influence of accession to international 
humanitarian conventions that provide for obligations that should be honored in 














73 Hannum, supra note 19, at 328. 
74 Id. at 318. 
75 Id. at 319 (citing THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW 108 (1989)). 
76 Id. 
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C. CONVENTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS  
 
1. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
 
The first Convention that specifically addressed refugees and stateless 
individuals was the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
1951 Convention). The 1951 Convention arose in similar fashion to the 1948 
UDHR, as the international community sought to rectify and prohibit the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis during the Second World War. Notably, the 
1951 Convention sought to establish the simple command that refugees were in 
need of protection from persecution.78 The 1951 Convention acknowledged the 
existence of statelessness, as it explicitly provided refugee protections to persons 
lacking a nationality who feared persecution on one of the five delineated 
grounds: race, religion, nationality, member of a particular social group, or 
political opinion.79 While the 1951 Convention served a valuable purpose in 
establishing legal recognition of stateless persons, it did very little to combat 
statelessness and reduce its prevalence.80 Nonetheless, many of the rights later 
codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR), the 1954 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (the 1954 Convention), 
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (the 1961 
Convention) are preceded by the 1951 Convention. The 1951 Convention 
initiated a process that “entrenched and enhanced prior state practice”81 of 
addressing statelessness in the international arena. 
 
2. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
Two United Nations conventions specifically address the problem of 
statelessness.  The first was the 1954 Convention (entered into force in 1960). 
The 1954 Convention possesses narrowly tailored purposes: to define a class of 
stateless persons, to regulate and improve their status, and to assure to them the 
widest possible exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.82 In defining a 
class of stateless persons, Article 1 of the 1954 Convention defined a stateless 
person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the 
operation of its laws.”83 The 1954 Convention was intended to improve the 
position of stateless persons by regulating their status, and by providing that 
basic rights of stateless persons be respected by their countries of residence 
without discrimination of race, religion, or nation of origin. Further, the 1954 
Convention mandates that the host country provide “the same treatment as is 
accorded to aliens generally,” except in places where the Convention provides 
 
 
78 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees pmbl., July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 Jill I. Goldenziel, The Curse of the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in International 
Law, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579, 582 (2016).  
82 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons pmbl., Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 
[hereinafter 1954 Convention].  
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more favorable protections, including documentation (Article 27 and 28), and 
security from arbitrary expulsion (Article 31).84 However, the initiative to reduce 
statelessness required further international cooperation and an alignment of 
domestic laws. 
 
3. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was the additional 
instrument that the international community had long awaited. One of the most 
important parts of the 1961 Convention is that it imposes positive obligations on 
States to grant nationality under certain circumstances, which contrasted with 
the primarily negative obligations on States that were imposed in the 1930 
Hague Convention.85 For example, Article 1 of the 1961 Convention requires a 
State party to grant nationality to a person born in its territory who would 
otherwise be left stateless,86 though the state does retain autonomy to proscribe 
certain conditions to this mandate. Under the 1961 Convention, state parties are 
required to provide mechanisms for persons born on/in their territory to acquire 
nationality.87 In addition, the 1961 Convention provides limitations as to when 
a State could rid a person of their nationality in the absence of acquiring 
another.88 Further, the 1961 Convention affirmatively addresses the problem of 
general equality norms with regard to citizenship law.89 The 1961 Convention 
illustrates that it is necessary to establish a link between the loss or denial of 
nationality and the loss or denial of national protection. It is ultimately through 
the understanding that in the absence of nationality, fundamental human rights 
ensured by national protection may be infringed, and in turn, that international 
consensus must arise that a right to nationality has become a part of customary 
international law. This is further evidenced by the fact that the entrustment of 
 
 
84 Id. art. 7(1). 
85 Compare 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 64, with Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Convention]. See generally MARILYN 
ACHIRON, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PARLIAMENTARIANS 12 (2005), http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/nationality_en.pdf (“The articles 
of the Convention aim to avoid statelessness at birth, but they neither prohibit the possibility of revocation 
of nationality under certain circumstances, nor retroactively grant citizenship to all currently stateless 
persons. The Convention also provides for the creation of a body to which a person who may benefit from 
the provisions of the Convention may apply to have his/her claim examined and to seek assistance in 
presenting his claim to the appropriate authority. The General Assembly subsequently asked UNHCR to 
fulfill this role.”). 
86 1961 Convention, supra note 85, art. 1.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Expert Meeting: Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention 
and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality, Summary Conclusions, ¶ 
3, http://www.unhcr.org/5465e2cb9.pdf [hereinafter Interpreting the 1961 Convention] (“The principle 
of gender equality enshrined in the ICCPR and CEDAW must be taken into account when interpreting 
the 1961 Convention. In particular, CEDAW Article 9(1) guarantees that women shall enjoy equality 
with men in their ability to acquire, change or retain their nationality. Of particular importance for the 
interpretation of the loss provisions of the 1961 Convention is the fact that Article 9 prescribes that the 
States Parties shall ensure that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband 
during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force up her 
the nationality of the husband. Under CEDAW Article 9(2) States must also grant women equal rights 
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this responsibility has been placed in the hands of the UNHCR by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
 
D. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FULFILLMENT OF 
CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS 
 
The UNHCR is entrusted by the General Assembly to fulfill the functions 
delineated under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention.90 When the 1961 
Convention came into force, the UNHCR assumed the Article 11 
responsibilities, “of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this 
Convention may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance in 
presenting it to the appropriate authority.”91 For much of the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the UNHCR has served as an important intermediary between 
stateless persons and respective host states in order to resolve legal questions of 
nationality.92 As such, this intermediary position serves as a significant reference 
point for consensus on state practice concerning nationality and the problem of 
statelessness. Indeed, though there are a minimal number of signatories to the 
1961 Convention, it may be argued that “other human rights treaties have also 
become important in the protections of stateless persons.”93  Among such 
standards proclaimed by the 1961 Convention and other human rights 
conventions, minimally, is an obligation to avoid the creation of stateless 
persons.94 
 
E. THE CUSTOMARY RIGHT TO NATIONALITY 
 
Though it is clear that international law has traditionally afforded sovereign 
discretion to states with respect to their nationality processes, such autonomy 
has been considerably restricted by progress in international human rights law.95 
Because the formal attribution of nationality is the link through which persons 
are afforded rights, privileges and protections at both domestic and international 
law, it is critical that nations honor the right to nationality as codified under 
Article 15 of the 1948 UDHR.96 The human rights system is rooted in the 
principle of universality, and statelessness should not be an obstacle to the 
enjoyment of human rights protections at international law.   
Finding customary obligations to an absolute right of nationality is 
problematic, however, in part, because it is difficult to ascertain consistency of 
state practice in matters of citizenship determination.97 In addition, accession to 
the 1951 Convention, the 1954 Convention, and the 1961 Convention is far from 
 
 
90 See GA Res. 50/152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/1 (Feb. 9, 1996). 
91 1961 Convention, supra note 85, art. 11. 
92 UNHRC Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods, and Data Consideration, U.N. 
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.unhcr.org/afr/statistics/country/45c06c662/unhcr-statistical-online-population-database-
sources-methods-data-considerations.html.  
93 Foster & Lampert, supra note 21, at 567. 
94 1961 Convention, supra note 85. 
95 Mirna Adjami & Julia Harrington, The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 93 (2008). 
96 UDHR, supra note 69, art. 15. 
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universal.98 However, the UNHCR reports that from 2011 to 2015 there were 49 
accessions to the two statelessness Conventions, indicating some progress in 
recent years by states.99 Because illustrating consistency of state practice in 
nationality processes is impractical, it is necessary to emphasize specific 
obligations that have attained more universal customary character that directly 
affect domestic citizenship practices. Consequently, rather than attempting to 
delineate broad obligations and duties upon states regarding permanent 
acquisition of nationality through vague background principles of human rights, 
it is prudent to illustrate specific facets of domestic citizenship frameworks that, 
if reconciled with obligations under international human rights law, would serve 
to better alleviate the global statelessness problem. What remains in the absence 
of universal accession, however, at a minimum, are foundational principles of 
non-discrimination and protection against arbitrary deprivation that can be said 
to have attained more universal character.100 
 As will be explored in the following section, though, the right to 
nationality is codified in the 1948 UDHR.101 The practical reality in the wake of 
widespread, prolonged conflict is that millions of displaced persons do not have 
access to necessary administrative processes to realize their fundamental human 
right to nationality.102 The unparalleled burden faced by neighboring countries 
renders it impossible to provide necessary services to the massive influx of 
immigrants.103 Though principles of non-discrimination in matters of nationality 
determination appear to have achieved universal character, the reality for 
persons left stateless as a result of the Syrian conflict is that domestic legislation 
in the region maintains discriminatory provisions that obstruct access to 
citizenship. This note urges, in part, that the maintenance of such discriminatory 
legislation contravenes obligations under international law and, in turn, 
contributes to the creation of stateless persons. Further, as international law has 
developed to favor the protection of human rights, it may be argued that 
domestic autonomy over citizenship determinations is restricted when domestic 









98 See TENDAYI BLOOM, UNU-GCM INSTITUTE ON GLOBALIZATION CULTURE & MOBILITY, 
PROBLEMATIZING THE CONVENTIONS ON STATELESSNESS (2001), 
collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:1969/pdf0201BLOOM.pdf. 
99 U.N. Conventions on Statelessness, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/un-conventions-on-statelessness.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). 
100 Interpreting the 1961 Convention, supra note 89. 
101 UDHR, supra note 69, art. 15. 
102 BRONWEN MANBY, WORLD BANK GROUP, IDENTIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF FORCED 
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IV. THE OBSTACLES PROVIDED BY SYRIAN NATIONALITY LEGISLATION 
AND ATTEMPTS AT REFORM  
 
 
Amidst the chaos and destruction, hundreds of thousands of Syrian families 
are left vulnerable as they flee their homes. Refugees have been forced to settle 
in distant foreign lands, often without proper documentation for themselves, and 
in many cases for their children.104  Such confusion amidst this chaotic struggle 
has allowed the fundamental problem of statelessness to rear its ugly head. The 
conflict has proved to further complicate the difficult systems of nationality law 
in the region, and it has left many, especially women and children, without 
recourse to establish their fundamental human right to a nationality.105 The 
following section will explore the Syrian Nationality Law, illustrating its 
complexities and most critically its discriminatory practices that indicate the 
demonstrable need for a call to action from the international community. 
 
A. SYRIAN NATIONALITY LAW 
 
The Syrian Nationality Act was established on November 20, 1969 under 
decree number 276, following the coming to power of the Baath regime.106 In 
1976, the enacting regulations were issued and there have been no amendments 
to the legislation since then.107 The Syrian Nationality Act is deficient in three 
respects: first, its adherence to strict, patriarchal jus sanguinis principles 
perpetuate statelessness through gender discrimination in the acquisition of 
citizenship;108 second, though Syrian naturalization provisions are theoretically 
accessible, decisions of naturalization are discretionary in nature and perpetuate 
discriminatory practices against certain ethnic groups;109 and third, the Syrian 
Nationality Act runs in contravention of Syria’s obligations under international 
law.110 The deficiencies of Syrian Nationality legislation are further exacerbated 
by the current conflict in Syria, as the forced displacement of millions have left 




104 Id.  
105 Inst. on Statelessness & Inclusion & the Glob. Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Submission 
to the Human Rights Council, 26th Session of the Universal Period Review: Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 2 
(Mar. 2016) [hereinafter Submission to the HRC] . 
106 ZAHRA ALBARAZI, STATELESSNESS PROGRAMME, TILBURG L. SCHOOL, THE STATELESS SYRIANS 
6 (May 2013), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52a983124.pdf (“Article 43 of the Syrian constitution, 
established in 1973 under Baath party ruling, recognizes that Syrian citizenship is to be regulated by 
legislation. The constitution does not, therefore, set the conditions for acquiring or losing nationality – 
this is done through a separate decree. As such, amendments to the nationality act can be adopted through 
a regular legislative procedure and without the need for constitutional amendment. It also implies that is 
within the power of the authorities to pass additional decrees relating to the enjoyment of nationality.”).  
107 Id. 
108 Kristina Melicherová, Born in Exile – Children of Syrian Refugees Exposed to Statelessness 14 
(2016) (Masters thesis) (available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=139974). 
109 Legislative Decree 276 - Nationality Law [Syrian Arab Republic], art. 6 (1969) [hereinafter 
Nationality Law]. 
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B. THE PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION UNDER SYRIAN 
NATIONALITY LAWS 
 
In Syria, the primary means by which one acquires nationality is through 
paternalistic jus sanguinis,111 meaning that a right to citizenship is passed to a 
child who is born of citizen parents. The 2012 Constitution of Syria (hereinafter 
“2012 Constitution”), reiterating and reaffirming principles of the 1973 Syrian 
Constitution (hereinafter “1973 Constitution”) theoretically indicates legal 
equality for Syrian men and women, as it states under Article 33 Section 3, 
“Citizens shall be equal in rights and duties without discrimination among them 
on grounds of sex, origin, language, religion or creed.”112 However, under the 
Syrian Nationality Law, citizenship is only passed to a child from a Syrian father. 
Article 3(a) of the Syrian Nationality Law Legislative Decree 275 1969 states 
that “anyone born inside or outside the country to a Syrian Arab father . . . shall 
be considered as Syrian Arabs ipso facto.”113   
Though the former mention of gender equality under Syrian Constitutional 
Law should seemingly prevail, Syrian Nationality Law proscribes that jus 
sanguinis principles are applied strictly by paternal lineage.114 Though Article 
3(a) theoretically preserves the right to citizenship regardless of place of birth, 
legislation in practice requires that children be able to prove their descent from 
a Syrian father. Children who are unable to prove patriarchal Syrian lineage will 
be unable to attain Syrian citizenship. In exceptional cases, Syrian Nationality 
Law does provide protections to children unable to prove paternal lineage, so 
long as the child is born within Syria.115 Such protection, however, is an empty 
gesture for displaced families and leaves them without recourse.116  
In recent decades, there have been attempts to reform Syria’s discriminatory 
nationality law.117 In 2004, the Syrian Women’s League presented reformed 
legislation in an attempt to expose and ultimately eliminate the discriminatory 
phenomena produced by Syrian Nationality Legislation. This attempt to gain 
equality, however, was rejected in 2008 on the basis that it contravened 
provisions of Sharia law.118 Article 3 of the 1973 Constitution stipulates the two 
following foundational principles, “1. Islam is the religion of the President of 
the Republic; and, 2. Islamic jurisprudence shall be the main source of 
legislation.”119 In turn, the 2012 Constitution “has secured the right of religious 
 
 
111 ALBARAZI, supra note 106, at 7. Syria is one of twenty-seven countries around the world that 
continues to discriminate against women in their ability to confer their nationality to their children. “There 
are some exceptions whereby nationality can be acquired in the absence of a paternal link, such as for 
foundlings who are found on the territory and for children who are born to an unknown father and a Syrian 
national mother,” though it is unclear that such decrees are in practice. Id; see also Nationality Law, supra 
note 109. 
112 CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Feb. 26, 2012, art. 33. 
113 Submission to the HRC, supra note 105, ¶ 11 (citing Nationality Law, supra note 109, art. 3(a)). 
114 ALBARAZI, supra note 111. 
115 Id. at 8. 
116 Id. (“Women can transfer nationality only in the exceptional case that the father is unknown – 
paternity has not been legally established – and only if the child in question was also born in Syria.” 
(citing Nationality Law)). 
117 Sawsan Zakzak, Syrian Women’s Right Pass on Citizenship to Children: An Appraisal, LEGAL 
AGENDA (Jan. 8, 2016), http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=742&folder=articles&lang=en. 
118 Submission to the HRC, supra note 105, ¶ 14. 
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communities to draft discriminatory personal status laws.”120  The fourth 
paragraph of Article 3 of the 2012 Constitution provides: “The personal status 
of religious communities shall be protected and respected.”121 Such legislation 
furthers principles of patriarchal guardianship over women, and as such can be 
considered as “the legal criterion for women's rights” in Syria; meaning that 
absent significant reform, “discriminatory effects will be reflected in civil laws, 
particularly the Nationality Law.”122 
The initiative for reform was revived in 2012, on the international plane, 
during periodic review by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter, 
the “Committee”), when the Syrian government presented preparations of a draft 
amendment to the nationality law that would permit women to confer citizenship 
to children on an equal basis with Syrian men.123 Such an amendment would 
have been a significant step in the right direction for Syrian women and children. 
The Committee, however, merely iterated its concerns that the amendment had 
yet to be addressed in Parliament.124 Additionally, and more critically, the bill 
has yet to receive public attention. Absent significant, meaningful discussion in 
the public forum, the likelihood that this critical legislation will pass is meager 
at best. Furthermore, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, it is estimated that “[o]ne fourth of all Syrian refugee families are now 
headed by women alone, as husbands and fathers have been forcibly separated 
from families by war.”125  In the wake of such widespread destruction, it may 
ultimately prove an insurmountable task for thousands of children to attain 
fundamental human rights. 
 
C. VIOLATING OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Syria’s discriminatory nationality legislation is in violation of the nation’s 
obligations under international law. Syria is not party to the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness.126 Syria is, however, party to the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which obligates State 
parties “to ensure that women and men have equal ability to acquire, change, 
and retain their nationality and to confer their nationality to children and 
spouses.”127 Article 9(1) of CEDAW requires that state parties “grant women 
equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality.”128In 
addition, Article 9(2) obligates state parties to “grant women equal rights with 
 
 
120 Zakzak, supra note 117. 
121 CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Feb. 26, 2012, art. 3. 
122 Zakzak, supra note 117.  
123 Submission to the HRC, supra note 105, ¶ 15. 
124 Id. 
125 Jana Mason (Sr. Advisor, External Relations & Gov’t Affairs, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees) 
Statement Regarding Human Rights of Stateless People (Mar. 23, 2015). 
126 States Party to the Statelessness Conventions and Pledges to Accede, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/statelessness/4d651eeb6/world-map-parties-1954-
convention-relating-status-stateless-persons-1961.html (as is Oct. 1, 2012). 
127 Submission to the HRC, supra note 105, ¶ 6. 
128 Id. (quoting G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
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men with respect to the nationality of their children.”129Syria maintains a 
reservation with respect to Article 9(2), however, it maintains no objection to 
Article 9(1).130According to a report produced by the Institute on Statelessness 
and Inclusion as a submission to the Human Rights Council at the 26th Session 
of the Universal Periodic Review, the organization urges that “Article 9 among 
others is ‘central to the object and purpose of the Convention and that the 
reservations impact negatively on the enjoyment by women of their rights.’”131 
Consequently, “the maintenance of nationality laws which discriminate on the 
basis of gender are themselves in conflict with the object and purpose of the 
Convention and with the general obligation of all state parties to ‘agree to pursue 
by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women.’”132  
Syria is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).133 The ICCPR 
requires that states ensure a child’s right to nationality under Article 24.134 In 
addition, under Article 26, the instrument requires that all citizens be equal 
before the law and not subject to discrimination on any ground, including 
gender.135 Syria’s Nationality Law violates these provisions. With respect to the 
CRC, Article 7 and Article 8 are especially relevant. Article 7 provides that a 
child has “the right to acquire a nationality.”136 Article 8 obligates State Parties 
to “undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations.”137 According to the Institute 
on Statelessness and Inclusion, Articles 7 and 8 are to be read in conjunction 
with CRC Article 2, which provides for nondiscrimination based on the gender 
of the child or the parent, and Article 3, which states that the “best interest of the 
Child shall be a primary consideration.”138 Thus, it is clear that as far as Syria’s 
Nationality Law discriminates against women with respect to their ability to 
confer citizenship to their children, the legislation contravenes Syria’s 









129 CEDAW, supra note 128, art. 9(2). 
130Status of Treaties: Chapter IV Human Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTIONS, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last updated Nov. 3, 2018) (following the hyperlink for the “Syrian 
Arab Republic” as found in the “Participant” column). 
131 Submission to the HRC, supra note 105, ¶ 6. 
132 Id. (second emphasis added). 
133 Id. ¶¶ 7–8.  
134 Id. ¶ 7. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. ¶ 8 (quoting G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 7 (Nov. 20, 
1989) [hereinafter CRC]). 
137 CRC, supra note 136, art. 8(1).  
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V. NEIGHBORING DOMESTIC RESPONSE AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
 
 
The following section provides a survey of two countries neighboring Syria 
that have registered the most Syrian asylum seekers: Turkey and Lebanon. This 
section will illustrate the practical, legal, and administrative realities faced by 
nations that have been most affected by mass flight from Syria due to prolonged 
conflict. There are currently 2.8 million Syrians registered in Turkey139 and 
nearly 1.5 million registered in Lebanon.140 As noted by journalist Elena 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, this figure is best put into context by noting that during the 
“so-called European ‘refugee-crisis’ a total of 884,461 Syrian refugees applied 
for asylum across Europe between April 2011 and October 2016.”141 From an 
empirical perspective, the burden felt by European countries pales in comparison 
to that felt by neighboring countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon, as Syrians 
flee across their borders in search of safety in person and dignity in life. Such 
vast, forced migration places immense political and administrative strain on 
neighboring countries.142 This strain, in turn, further complicates the ability of 
refugees to navigate the necessary processes needed to achieve not only physical 
separation from the conflict, but also legally recognized status in foreign nations. 
 




Turkey has been at the forefront of the reception of forced migrants from 
Syria since the inception of the Syrian conflict.143 This can be attributed to the 
fact that Turkey has retained an adamant, anti-Assad stance from the beginning 
of the crisis, which further illustrates the Turkish government’s stake in the 
future of Syria due to significant populations of Kurdish and Turkmen 
populations.144 Additionally, such a stance also indicates a strategic interest in 
being viewed as having a significant political role in the region by taking an 
“active and direct role in the ongoing crisis.”145 In response to Assad’s lethal 
crackdown on anti-government protests, Syrians began to flee across Turkish 
borders in April 2011.146 During the same year, migration to Turkey ebbed and 
flowed, and by the end of the year, only 8,000 Syrian refugees resided in 
 
 
139 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon Face an Uncertain 
2017, CONVERSATION (Jan. 3, 2018), https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-jordan-and-
lebanon-face-an-uncertain-2017-70747. 
140 Lebanon, EUR. CIVIL PROT. & HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS, 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdf (last updated Apr. 
6, 2018). 
141 Fiddian-Qasmlyeh, supra note 139.  
142 Nicole Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 255, 255 (2015)  
143 See AHMET İÇDUYGU, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., SYRIAN REFUGES IN TURKEY: THE LONG ROAD 
AHEAD 6 (2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead. 
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Turkey.147 Forced migration escalated, however, when efforts to achieve a 
cease-fire failed in 2012.148 As tensions with Assad’s government heightened 
and militant jihadists continued to seize territory inside Syrian borders, forced 
migration to Turkey exploded as 55,000 Syrians began seeking asylum per 
month by late 2014.149 Turkish reception of forced Syrian migrants was initially 
exceptionally welcoming, though evidence suggests that Turkish authorities 
were quick to assume that the crisis would be temporary, and the reality of 
prolonged migrant reception has begun to present ever-increasing difficulties.150 
Though Turkey has acceded to the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the scope of the Convention’s applicability to 
asylum seekers is limited. In addition, Turkey’s Settlement Act favors persons 
of Turkish descent in determining eligibility for temporary citizenship and 
eventual, possible citizenship. Though major changes in Turkey’s asylum 
system have occurred, “most current asylum seekers are placed under 
‘temporary protection’ for settlement in another country rather than being 
accepted as refugees for settlement in Turkey.”151 Specifically, in the case of 
Syrian migrants, rights and protections have been expanded since the beginning 
of the conflict, however, “they remain barred from gaining regular refugee status 
and instead are classified as beneficiaries of temporary protection.”152 
This restriction on refugee protections exists because Turkey’s instrument 
of accession to the 1951 Convention stipulates “that the Turkish government 
will maintain a geographic limitation pursuant to the Convention’s article 1b, 
limiting the scope of the Convention’s application in Turkey ‘only to persons 
who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.’”153 As a 
result, “‘Turkey can only legally accept European asylum seekers as ‘refugees’ 
stricto sensu,’ even though ‘the majority of asylum seekers in Turkey originate 
from non-European states.’”154  This geographical limitation is not fully 
implemented, however, as:  
 
Turkey allows the . . . [UNHCR] to operate and conduct 
refugee status determination procedures whereby refugee 
status is jointly granted by the UNHCR and the Ministry of the 
Interior with the underlying condition that accepted refugees 
do not locally integrate but instead resettle in a third country. 
Considering its geographical proximity to conflict- ridden 
states, Turkey’s geographical limitation disqualifies a vast 
number of asylum seekers and refugees seeking permanent 
protection from the Turkish state.155 
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The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, enacted in April 2013, 
provides non-European refugees certain protections under one of three types of 
temporary status: conditional refugee status, humanitarian residence permits, or 
temporary protection.156 As most Syrian migrants are classified to receive 
temporary protection status,157 it is crucial that these processes be accessible to 
asylum seekers. As Human Rights Watch reports, however, “delays of up to six 
months in registration for temporary protection mean that some refugees are 
unable to get basic services and live in fear of being forced to live in a camp or 
deported.”158 
According to a 2016 report issued by the UNHCR, Turkey has, under a 
temporary protection regime, ensured “non-refoulement and assistance in 22 
camps, where an estimated 217,000 people are staying.”159 Under the European 
Union – Turkey Agreement, matters are further complicated for Syrian refugees 
even once they leave Turkey. There are two legal devices by which Greek 
authorities may return asylum seekers to Turkey without the necessity of 
examining an asylum seekers claim on its merits.160 The first of these devices is 
“first country of asylum,” whereby Syrian asylum seekers may be returned to a 
country if they possess “sufficient protection” in the first nation as defined under 
Article 35 of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive.161 The second of these 
devices, known as “safe third country,” allows an asylum seeker to be returned 
“to a country where they could have requested and received refugee status.”162 
Because Syrians are excluded from Turkey’s Refugee Convention protections 
as per geographical limitations, Turkey should not be considered to constitute a 
“safe third country.”163 With regard to the first mechanism, its application 
depends on whether the asylum seeker is recognized in that country as a refugee 
or, in the alternative, provided with “sufficient protection” there.164 As noted, 
Syrians are explicitly excluded from refugee status in Turkey.165   
According to the UNHCR, sufficient protection means that an asylum 
seeker is granted “a right of legal stay and [is to] be accorded standards of 
treatment commensurate with [the Refugee Convention] and international 
human rights standards,” including for “living, work rights, health care, and 
education.”166 Finally, and most critically, the UNHCR has contended that “the 
capacity of States to provide protection in practice should be taken into 
consideration, particularly if they are already hosting large refugee 
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refugees.168 The nation has felt the prolonged impact of the Syrian refugee crisis, 
and the administrative realities of facilitating the safe arrival, departure, and 




According to a March 2017 factsheet published by the European 
Commission on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, with more than 1.5 
million refugees, Lebanon accounts for the highest refugee per capita.169 Since 
the outset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees 
have fled across Lebanese borders.170 Lebanon is a country with an already 
fragile system of government and infrastructure, and both its policies and 
practical execution of such directives is indicative of a nation unprepared to meet 
the crisis adequately. 
The legal framework that exists for the protection of refugees in Lebanon is 
troublesome at best. The nation is neither party to the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees, nor does it have any domestic legislation that 
addresses refugee status protections.171 Syrian asylum seekers, thus, are afforded 
no specific status of protection once inside Lebanese borders.172 Furthermore, 
the Lebanese government characterizes such migrants as “displaced persons,” 
not as “refugees.”173 In October 2014, three years after significant violent 
outbreak and upheaval began in Syria, the Lebanese Council of Ministers 
adopted an official policy on Syrian displacement, “one explicit goal of which 
is to decrease the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory 
and encouraging return to Syria.”174 While the Lebanese government was 
initially praised by the UNHCR for apparent policies of open borders and the 
facilitation of resettlement amidst the regional crisis, field research cited in an 
article by Maja Janmyr suggests that these policies were the product of political 
stalemate and a literal inability to close access to Lebanese territory before the 
influx began.175 Decentralized government response to the crisis led to piece-
meal application of rudimentary policies implemented by local authorities in an 
attempt to establish control.176 “One of the clearest examples of this municipality 
autonomy,” according to Janmyr, was the implementation of curfews on Syrian 
refugees, “restricting freedom of movement.”177 
Lebanese policy toward mass emigration from Syria can be traced to the 
protracted Palestinian issue, which is often cited as evidence as to why many 
states in the region have refused to sign on to the 1951 Convention Relating to 
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the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.178 Though Lebanon is not party to 
the Convention, the nation is bound by the norms of non-refoulement under 
customary international law.179 Lebanon, like Turkey, has ratified the major 
international human rights instruments. In addition, foundational customary 
international human rights principles can be found in the Lebanese 
Constitution.180 As Janmyr notes, “[t]he Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution 
of 1926 (as amended in 1990) explicitly states that ‘Lebanon is […] a founding 
and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its 
covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”181   
Furthermore, it states, “the Government shall embody these principles in all 
fields and areas without exception.”182 As is noted by Janmyr, the embodiment 
of such principles “without exception” would include Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights preserving the right of refugees to seek asylum.183 
Until 2015, Lebanon did not have a formal framework of domestic legislation in 
place for refugees.184  In December 2014, Lebanese authorities instituted a new 
set of entry requirements and rules for Syrian refugees “already in Lebanon 
applying for and renewing residency permits.”185  Such policies, instituted in 
2015, were the first steps in the implementation of the Lebanese “Policy on 
Syrian Displacement,” adopted in October 2014.186  Such policies were intended 
to deter and prevent Syrian refugees from seeking refuge in Lebanon.187  As 
noted by Janmyr, the measures established in 2015 “entail restrictive conditions 
that are only applicable to Syrian nationals, and hence are discriminatory in 
comparison to other foreigners.”188  Consequently, such policies have left Syrian 
refugees vulnerable to exploitation, and in turn, they are faced with two choices: 
leave Lebanon or stay in the country and resign themselves to exploitation, 
“which in some cases even may amount to forced labour and human 
trafficking.”189  
Though Lebanon operated an open-door policy for Syrian migrants at the 
outset of the conflict, attaining legal residency status required a valid Syrian 
identity card or passport and entry through an official border checkpoint.190 After 
six months, this “entry coupon” could be renewed free of charge for an 
additional six months.191 After a year of residency, however, Syrian refugees 
were required to renew their status “at a cost of USD 200 per person/per year for 
everyone 15 and above.”192 Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon that either did 
not enter through an official border checkpoint, did not possess proper 
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documentation, or continued to reside inside Lebanon after their legal residency 
status expired were, and still are, subject to arrest, prosecution, and 
deportation.193 Because Syrian asylum seekers most often fled their homes with 
little money, without proper documentation, and often times were unable to 
cross at official border checkpoints, such administrative practices are likely to 
add to the already widespread statelessness problem. Most critically, as Janmyr 
notes, “[t]his practice has been aggravated by the fact that the Lebanese 
Government has declared the Syrian refugee crisis not to be governed by law, 
but by governmental decisions.”194 As relayed by one Lebanese lawyer through 
an interview cited by Janmyr, “the Syrian situation is not governed by law, but 
by security policy.”195 Consequently, domestic law is often ignored in practice 
and Syrian asylum seekers are left without recourse. 
 
 
VI. PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
The fundamental right to nationality should be considered a norm of 
customary international law.  As codified in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the ICCPR, the CRC, and the CEDAW, and as specifically 
addressed by the 1951 Convention, the 1954 Convention, and the 1961 
Convention, there exists a substantial global legal framework that urges State 
Parties to provide equal access to the right to a nationality and to avoid the 
creation of stateless persons. Tensions between sovereign authority over 
nationality determinations and the right to a permanent grant of nationality, 
ultimately, present inherent difficulties to solve immense problems of mass 
flight from conflict zones. The only means by which the statelessness problem 
might be alleviated is through global cooperation under international law by 
acknowledging a customary right to nationality and, in turn, customary 
obligations to minimally avoid statelessness.196 It is clear that inconsistencies 
between national practices concerning citizenship has further exacerbated the 
statelessness issue, as uniform state practice is difficult to establish so long as 
such discrepancies exist.197 What remains of paramount concern, however, is 
how the international community is to proceed to effectively allay the 
statelessness problem in the midst of such an immense crisis absent the ability 
to establish uniformity of state practice in citizenship determinations. First and 
foremost, domestic considerations must be examined. Maintenance of the 
current Syrian Nationality Law as it stands is an active contravention of Syria’s 
obligations under international law, and it must be reformed so as to eliminate 
provisions that perpetuate gender discrimination in citizenship determinations. 
Regional considerations, in practice, are difficult to address.   
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Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt currently host more than 5.2 
million registered Syrian refugees.198 This figure, though enormous, does not 
represent the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons who have not come 
forward for registration. Mass flight from the Syrian conflict has caused the 
worst humanitarian crisis in nearly two decades, and its impact upon neighboring 
nations is unparalleled. Nations bordering Syria were already under extreme 
economic duress, and loss of foreign investment, trade, and diminished tourism 
revenues as a result of the massive migrant influx have further crippled their 
economies. Security risks are immense, and local communities have had to face 
the brunt of these difficult circumstances.   
On November 2, 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
addressed the Third Committee, commenting on the difficulty in building peace 
in the modern world, as “[m]oral and legal boundaries embedded in international 
humanitarian law are crossed every day more deliberately, and with more 
impunity.”199 The Syrian conflict has resulted from “deep sectarian divisions, 
religious extremism, terrorism and governance challenges fueling the 
violence.”200 Furthermore, the High Commissioner emphasized that, in dealing 
with this immense humanitarian crisis, proximity should not define 
responsibility.201 So too, must responsibility for addressing the statelessness 
crisis not be defined by proximity to its source. In order for the fundamental 
right to an attributed nationality to be fully realized, the global community must 
participate in burden-sharing efforts. State engagement is critical. By forcing 
neighboring nations to bear a vastly disproportionate burden, ineffective 
administrative practices on the ground are furthered and facilitated, exacerbating 
the statelessness problem. Though international and sovereign tensions exist 
over autonomy to make citizenship decisions, what must remain as the 
foundation of global nationality practices is the progressive realization of human 
rights and, in turn, the preservation of human dignity. 
 
 
198 Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Oct. 
8, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/update-durable-solutions-syrian-refugees-8-october-2017. 
199 Press Release, General Assembly, Addressing Urgent Plight of Refugees Hinges on State 
Engagement, Determination, High Commissioner Tells Third Committee amid Calls for Burden Sharing, 
U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4183 (Nov. 2, 2016). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (emphasis added). 
